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Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs and the Opioid Crisis: Assessment of
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Abstract
ABSTRACT
Importance
Importance: A number of strategies and policies have been implemented to mitigate the opioid crisis,
including state Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) that are used to track and compile
patient prescription data. Because PDMPs are run independently by states, different characteristics of
PDMPs can impact success rates of the programs in controlling opioid prescriptions and overdose
deaths.
Objective
Objective: To assess the association between PDMP operating agency type and opioid prescriptions and
opioid overdose death rates.
Research Design
Design: The study utilized time-series data provided by the CDC and KFF, which included
information for 49 states and Washington D.C. with effective PDMPs. The impact of state operating type
was analyzed using regressions that controlled for the presence of a mandate. A qualitative portion was
conducted through an online opt-in survey that was sent out to emergency medicine, pain management,
and primary care physicians.
Main Outcome and Measures
Measures: The unit of observation was state-years, and the study period was 2006 to
2016 for opioid prescription rate and 2000 to 2017 for opioid overdose death rates.
Results
Results: Using opioid prescription rates, PDMPs with health-facing agencies combined with a mandate
decreased prescriptions by approximately 26 prescriptions per 100 individuals, which was statistically
significant at the 0.1% level. While most of the specific six agency types also decreased prescription rate,
most coefficients were not statistically significant. Looking at opioid overdose death, PDMPs with healthfacing agencies showed approximately 6 fewer deaths per 100,000 population, reaching statistically
significance at the 0.1% level. Similarly, broken down by specific agency type, most of these coefficients
did not reach similar statistically significant. The qualitative survey revealed that the majority of
physicians are aware of Pennsylvania’s PDMP operating agency. In addition, these physicians routinely
check the PDMP for patient prescription information, and 75.5% of participants have changed their
patients’ prescription plan after viewing the PDMP.
Conclusions and Relevance
Relevance: These findings suggest that operating agency type impacts effectiveness of
PDMPs in controlling for prescription rates and opioid overdose deaths. To maximize impact, healthfacing agencies should implement and operate PDMPs.
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ABSTRACT
Importance: A number of strategies and policies have been implemented to mitigate the opioid
crisis, including state Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) that are used to track and
compile patient prescription data. Because PDMPs are run independently by states, different
characteristics of PDMPs can impact success rates of the programs in controlling opioid
prescriptions and overdose deaths.
Objective: To assess the association between PDMP operating agency type and opioid
prescriptions and opioid overdose death rates.
Research Design: The study utilized time-series data provided by the CDC and KFF, which
included information for 49 states and Washington D.C. with effective PDMPs. The impact of
state operating type was analyzed using regressions that controlled for the presence of a mandate.
A qualitative portion was conducted through an online opt-in survey that was sent out to
emergency medicine, pain management, and primary care physicians.
Main Outcome and Measures: The unit of observation was state-years, and the study period was
2006 to 2016 for opioid prescription rate and 2000 to 2017 for opioid overdose death rates.
Results: Using opioid prescription rates, PDMPs with health-facing agencies combined with a
mandate decreased prescriptions by approximately 26 prescriptions per 100 individuals, which
was statistically significant at the 0.1% level. While most of the specific six agency types also
decreased prescription rate, most coefficients were not statistically significant. Looking at opioid
overdose death, PDMPs with health-facing agencies showed approximately 6 fewer deaths per
100,000 population, reaching statistically significance at the 0.1% level. Similarly, broken down
by specific agency type, most of these coefficients did not reach similar statistically significant.
The qualitative survey revealed that the majority of physicians are aware of Pennsylvania’s PDMP
operating agency. In addition, these physicians routinely check the PDMP for patient prescription
information, and 75.5% of participants have changed their patients’ prescription plan after viewing
the PDMP.
Conclusions and Relevance: These findings suggest that operating agency type impacts
effectiveness of PDMPs in controlling for prescription rates and opioid overdose deaths. To
maximize impact, health-facing agencies should implement and operate PDMPs.
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INTRODUCTION
The opioid epidemic is one of this country’s most pressing health concerns, affecting public
health in addition to social and economic welfare. The U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) declared a public health emergency in 2017 and announced accelerated
appointments of specialized personnel to develop regulations and policy guidelines to address the
emergency (Haffajee and Frank 2018). Earlier this year, HHS announced it would provide almost
$2 billion in funding for opioid-specific activities, including to support state and local society
groups, education, treatment and recovery services, response assistances, and more (Mishra 2019).
A recent study from researchers Florence, Zhou, Luo, and Xu (2016) conducted by the Centers of
Disease Control and Prevention estimates an “economic burden” of over $78 billion per year in
2013, caused specifically by misuse of opioid prescriptions. This accounts for a variety of societal
implications, including productivity losses, healthcare costs, public health expenditures, legal and
criminal justice involvement, and addiction treatment. Abuse and misuse of prescription opioids
has caused over 17,000 drug overdose deaths in 2016 (CDC Wonder 2017), a number that has
been increasing steadily over the past decade (Figure 1). In addition, approximately 21-29% of
patients will misuse opioids prescribed for chronic pain (NIDA 2019). Such statistics depict the
urgency and need of better policymaking in the face of crisis.
Opioids are a specific class of drugs that work through activating opioid receptors on nerve
cells, which block the feelings of pain between the brain and the body (Muldoon 2019). Over the
past decade, deaths involving opioids have skyrocketed, from just under 10,000 deaths in 1999 to
more than 42,000 in 2016, as noted by Jones et al. (2018). A few select key reasons can be
attributed to this increase, starting with a shifting notion that pain, as a medical symptom, was
highly undertreated. The World Health Organization addressed this undertreatment of pain in its
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Cancer Pain Monograph in the early 1990s and prompted a rapid progress of pain treatment in
various types of cancers. However, up to this point, opioids were only treated for cancer pain and
strictly avoided in chronic pain conditions, with the fear that increasing the length of time a patient
was on opioid medication was associated with a higher likelihood of abuse or misuse (Rosenblum,
Marsch, Joseph, and Portenoy 2008). The combination of physicians questioning why opioids were
only used in high-intensity cancer pain and launch of American Pain Society’s impactful “pain as
the fifth vital sign” paved the way for opioids to be medically prescribed for chronic non-cancer
pain treatment, as explained by Morone and Weiner (2013). The Joint Commission, Federation of
State Medical Boards, and Drug Enforcement Agency all approved measures that encouraged
opioid prescriptions to adequately manage pain and lessened the regulatory scrutiny over physician
prescribers (Baker 2017). Concurrently during this time period in 1996, Purdue Pharma released
and aggressive marketed OxyContin as the first line of treatment for non-malignant, non-cancer
pain (Van Zee 2009). While OxyContin was designed to provide 12 hours of continuous pain relief,
the pill could be crushed easily, allowing users to experience an intense high. As a result,
OxyContin became one of the most commonly abused drugs (Alpert, Evans, Lieber, and Powell
2019). All of these activities laid the foundation for the dramatic uptake of prescription-based
opioid for cancer pain, and most importantly, non-cancer chronic pain.
Opioid Prevention Strategies
With this increase in opioid prescription rates, a large focus over the past few years has
been on prevention and reduction of prescription opioid use. The U.S. Food and Drug
Administration outlines four key strategies: reducing the harm associated with opioid use,
decreasing opioid demand, limiting the lawful supply of opioid medications, and influencing
physicians’ prescribing practices (Gross and Gordon 2019). Harm reduction policies focus on
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limiting and reducing the level of harm associated with opioid and narcotic use, including
increased access to naloxone, an opioid antagonist that can reverse the respiratory effects caused
by overdoses, and clean syringe exchanges (Lynn and Galinkin 2017). Demand-reduction policies
concentrate on limiting the demand of opioid through substance abuse programs, addiction
treatment programs, and special medication-assisted treatment programs through FDA-approved
opioids such as methadone, buprenorphine, and extended-release, injectable naltrexone as
described by Alderks (2017). While demand-reduction policies can be effective, such efficacy
relies on those to experience opioid abuse to self-enroll in substance abuse and addiction treatment
prgrams. However, many believe that the most useful types of programs focus on reducing opioid
supply and changing prescriber patterns (Bonnie, Ford, and Phillip 2017). Such programs include
state-run Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, increased prescriber education and training,
abuse-deterrent drug reformulations, and additional black box drug warnings to avoid possibility
of overprescribing, reduce diversion, and discouraging drug misuse (Alpert, Powell, and Pacula
2017; Clark and Schumacher 2017).
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) are one type of supply-side programs
that focus on changing prescriber programs to reduce opioid supply. Characteristics of PDMPs
differ across states, as implementation of these programs is on a state-by-state basis. Such features
that vary across states’ PDMPs include various operational and administrative differences, such as
the operating agency, levels of drug schedules tracked, data collection and updating frequency,
mandated physician and prescriber viewing, inter-state data sharing, among other factors (Manasco
et al. 2016). While the majority of these factors have been studied by a variety of researchers, one
such operational feature that has been lacking in current research is the impact of the operational
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agency. There are six different types of agencies that run PDMPs: state Pharmacy Boards, state
Department of Health, Law Enforcement, Professional Licensing Agency, Substance Abuse
Agency, and Consumer Protection Agency. Because such agencies have different missions and
goals, it is important for policymakers and law officials to determine which agency can best run
the PDMPs and have the greatest impact on limiting prescription opioid access. This paper will
attempt to quantify the impact operating agency has opioid prescription rates and opioid overdose
deaths. Because each state is responsible for enforcing their own PDMP, it is important to
understand specific features of efficient PDMPs to better provide states policy makers with a
guideline of how they should structure and operate their PDMPs. Given this information, policy
makers and public health officials can develop more operationally successful PDMPs.
OVERVIEW OF CURRENT RESEARCH
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMP)s are state-level programs that that collect,
monitor, and analyze prescription dispensing data submitted by physicians and practitioners. Used
to support public health efforts in education, research, and abuse prevention, PDMPs have been
implemented to help physicians track and control certain prescriptions, which is especially useful
for highly addictive medicines such as opioids (Calvert and Campo-Flores 2016). This prescription
data is provided to physicians, pharmacists, and health practitioners with the goal of providing
prescribing entities broader information of a patient’s health history to minimize opioid misuse or
abuse (Islam and McRae 2014). Such information is also shared with insurance programs,
healthcare licensure boards, state and federal public health departments, and law enforcement to
better develop policies and procedures (Figure 2). PDMPs have been utilized in the past in
reducing prescription drug abuse and diversion, including for narcotics, tranquilizers, and
stimulants. While these programs serve as information databases, PDMPs do not interfere with
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appropriate medical use, and PDMPs do not serve as a barrier to necessary prescribing for patients
with legitimate concerns (Finklea, Sacco, and Bagalman 2014).
Originated from law enforcement mechanism, PDMPs function as a statewide electronic
database that stores and analyses prescribing and dispensing data for drugs and medications
classified as Federal controlled substances (Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2016).
Physicians and dispensers in all medical fields can use this data to both better understand a patient’s
prescription history, which can act as an informative tool in increasing awareness of highly
dangerous and active controlled medications (Irvine et al. 2014). With this increase in knowledge,
physicians and dispensers are generally more motivated to be more mindful in their prescription
given the medical history of a patient. For example, patients who have taken a Schedule II drug
for a continuous amount of time may be labeled as high-risk for an opioid-medication, critical
information that a physician should consider prior to prescribing. In many states, physicians and
prescribers are mandated to view their respective states’ PDMP prior to prescribing any medication
as an added cautionary metric, which aims to control who is able to receive opioids. As so, PDMPs
act as both a check point for patients and prescribers; patients who have long and unusual histories
of being on certain medications will likely be flagged as high-risk by physicians, and physicians
who have histories of over-prescribing will also likely be flagged as high-risk by law enforcement
and other state and federal agencies (Irvine et al. 2014).
The first PDMP was established by California in 1939, which tracked and monitored
prescriptions for various schedule II drugs, including morphine, opium, among other medications.
Hawaii, Illinois, Idaho, and New York followed shortly after. A large number of states enacted
PDMPs after the passing of the Harold Rogers Prescription Monitoring Program in 1996, which
provided initial guidelines and funding for states that desired to develop PDMPs (Elder and Pines
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2018). Currently, 49 states, D.C., and Guam have PDMPs have legislation in place that authorizes
PDMPs; Missouri is the only state has not implemented a PDMP (Haffajee, Jena, and Weiner
2015), though the state has attempted to pass program over seven different times. As a result,
Missouri falls among the top ranked states for overdose rates, opioid prescriptions, and arrests
related to illegal drug and narcotic use (Weber 2018). A recent article estimated that if Missouri
were to adopt a PDMP with robust features, overdose deaths would decrease by over 600 per year
(Patrick, Fry, Jones, and Buntin 2016).
General Effectiveness of State PDMP Programs
One of the most important questions surrounding PDMPs focuses on its effectiveness,
particularly in reducing rates of drug overdoses, opioid-specific overdoses, opioid prescription
rates, among other metrics. The research, however, is conflicting. Most papers differ on
methodology, dependent variable metrics, statistical analysis procedures, etc.
Most high-level analysis on overall effectiveness of PDMPs often find that PDMPs are not
that impactful. A recent report that focuses on the wide-scale impact of opioid prescription rates
after implementation of PDMP program found that there is no consistent pattern of discernible
change through studying four outcome measures: opioid prescribing, opioid diversion and supply,
opioid misuse, and opioid-related morbidity and mortality (Finley et al. 2017). This variation is
likely due a large number of factors, variations in study design, methods, inconsistent measures of
impact across the studies, and measurement of PDMPs across multiple states. In addition to study
disparities, there are discrepancies in the PDMP design itself; some states update data in their
PDMPs less frequently, some states mandate physicians to consult with the PDMPs before writing
prescriptions and other states vary in the responsibility that they place in physicians for misprescribing. All these differences amount variations in accuracy, timeliness, and reliability of the
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data, which inevitably interferes with the effectiveness of PDMPs. Researchers Paulozzi,
Kilbourne, and Desai (2011) studied the impact the PDMPs also concluded that implementation
of PDMPs were not significantly associated with lower rates of opioid overdose mortality or lower
rates of opioid prescription and consumption through their six-year observational study in the US.
While potentially an effective way to minimize opioid-related deaths and decrease prescription
rates, the overall effect of PDMPs appeared to be quite minimal. Similar to many other research
articles published, the authors ultimately from this study concluded that evidence that PDMP
implementation affects overdose rates is largely insufficient to firmly conclude its effectiveness;
select states actually experienced an increase in opioid and heroin abuse rates after implementation
of PDMPs (Fink et al. 2018). When using drug overdose mortality rates as a unit of measurement,
researchers Nam, Shea, and Shi (2017) established that PDMPs were not associated with any
reductions in drug overdose mortality rates and could be actually related to increased use from
other illicit drugs. As so, through this research, a majority of arguments that look at general
influence of PDMPs contend that effectiveness of these programs is not highly impactful.
Specific Robust Characteristics of Select PDMPs
Because studies have generally shown the effectiveness of PDMPs to be unclear, many
researchers have conducted deeper dives into understanding the association between certain
characteristics of PDMPs and its specific impact on controlling opioid prescription rates. Because
PDMPs are implemented on a state-by-state basis, many features are variable and are not constant
across different states’ program, for example mandating prescribers to access the PDMP prior to
prescribing, data updating frequency, the level of drug schedule monitored, among other factors
(Manasco et al. 2016). Thus, researchers have begun to break down specific characteristics of
PDMPs to understand which features increase effectiveness of these programs.
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One significant feature is the impact of mandatory PDMPs, in which physicians and
dispensers are required to view a patient’s prescription history from the PDMPs before prescribing.
In the specific case of emergency physicians, researchers Suffoletto, Lynch, Pacella, Yealy, and
Callaway (2018) established that opioid prescribing did decrease significantly, and its findings
support mandating PDMP programs. Such “must access” PDMPs meaningfully reduce opioid
misuse metrics in Medicare Part D when compared with PDMPs that do not implement this
provision, a finding critical to a paper by Buchmueller and Carey (2018). In another conducted by
researchers in the journal Drug and Alcohol Dependence, researchers Strickler et al. (2019)
discussed how mandatory use laws for PDMPs increased prescriber registration and utilization of
the program, which resulted in lower rates of opioid prescribing and overlapping opioid
prescribing in two specific states.
Other robust characteristics that have been studied are the frequency of data reporting,
schedules of drugs monitored, inter-state data reporting, and access to PDMP information by law
enforcement. Not surprisingly, those programs in states with higher frequency of data reporting
tend to see a slower increase in prescription opioid-related poisoning rates in a nationallyrepresented study of privately insured adults (Pauly, Slavova, Delcher, Freeman, and Talbert
2018). Researcher Bryce Pardo (2017) concluded that states with generally stronger PDMPs have
fewer prescription opioid overdose drug deaths than states with weaker PDMPs in the period
between 1999 and 2014. Pardo defines strength as the presence and importance of certain
characteristics, such as data reporting frequency, the amount of drug schedules monitored, access
for law enforcement, inter-state data sharing, and the presence of an oversight board. The
importance of high data reporting and greater drugs supervised is further advanced by this study,
which discovered that while PDMPs had great variation, they were in general associated with
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reductions in opioid-related death rates, especially if the PDMP had a higher number of robust
characteristics, such as monitoring four or more drug schedules and updating data on a weekly or
daily basis (Patrick, Fry, Jones, and Buntin 2016). Pauly et al. (2018) also concluded that states
that monitored more schedules experienced fewer increases in the risk of prescription opioidrelated poisoning over time. Lastly, operational PDMPs, defined as being accessible to both law
enforcement and prescribers, was noted as another key characteristic that strongly correlates with
decreasing prescriptions rates over time (Pauly et al. 2018).
Proposed Research Goals
In addition to the differences in characteristics of PDMPs, the implementation agency also
varies on a state-by-state level. No studies have currently been conducted examining the effects of
these administrative differences on opioid overdose death rates and opioid prescription rates. Each
state is able to enact and authorize their PDMPs through the department they believe has the
resources to properly oversee and handle this database. A variety of state agencies administers
PDMPs, including state Pharmacy Boards, state Department of Health, Law Enforcement,
Professional Licensing Agency, Substance Abuse Agency, and Consumer Protection Agency
(Figure 3). Because each agency may have slightly different objectives, effectiveness of PDMPs
may relate heavily with the administering agency.
PROPOSED METHODS & ANALYSIS
Research Question
This paper will aim to analyze and discuss the effects of overall agency type and effects of
the specific operating agency on opioid overdose death rates and opioid prescription rates.
Different agency types that run such PDMP programs may have conflicting interests that may
make them more or less strict when defining specific terms and characteristics of their PDMP.
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Regression analysis will be based on similar methods outlined in a paper by Buchmueller and
Carey (2018), which looked at the impact of PDMPs on rates of opioid misuse, and a paper by
Wang (2019), which examined the influence of health information technology in reducing opioid
related mortality.
Research Data
The independent variable will be the specific operating agency that runs the PDMP. The
website Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Training and Technical Assistance Center
contains detailed information about each states’ PDMP program; for each state, the websites list
the specific agency responsible for monitoring the PDMP (ex. Alabama’s PDMP is run by the
Alabama Department of Public Health).
Dependent variables will be the opioid overdose death rates and opioid prescription rates.
Age-adjusted opioid overdose death rates are archived on the Kaiser Family Foundation website,
broken down by year and by state. In analyzing prescription opioid rates, the Center for Disease
Control or CDC has available data for both rates of medically recorded opioid prescriptions on a
yearly state-by-state basis.
Empirical Strategy: Effect of Agency Type & Specific Operating Agency
The principal empirical analysis will be split into two parts. First, the overall impact of an
agency type will be analysis by determining the differences on opioid prescription rate and opioid
overdose deaths. Agency type will be defined by determining the main industry focus or goal of
who that agency serves to benefit. The six different agencies that run PDMPs are state Pharmacy
Boards, state Department of Health, Law Enforcement, Professional Licensing Agency, Substance
Abuse Agency, and Consumer Protection Agency. Health-facing agency types will be defined as
agency types that focus specifically on the medical and health implications of any policy. Out of
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the six agencies, state Pharmacy Boards, state Department of Health, and Substance Abuse
Agencies will be categorized as health-facing agency types. Consumer-facing agency types will
be defined as agency types that exist to serve the interests of the end consumer through enacting
policies that impact consumer safety and product usage. Three agency types, Law Enforcement,
Professional Licensing Agency, and Consumer Protection Agency will be categorized as
consumer-facing agency types. I hypothesize that consumer-facing agencies would likely have
greater reduction in opioid overdose rates and opioid prescription rates given these agencies exist
to purposely serve consumers and protect consumers’ well-being. These agencies have fewer ties
to physicians and prescribers, and perhaps would be less likely to be influenced by advice and
recommendations provided by medical clinicians. The first regression model will test the impact
of state operating agency type on a yearly basis on opioid prescription rate and opioid overdose
deaths. The regression model will be:
yst = δs + δt + β2(mandate) + mandate*(healthagencies) + εst
where y is an outcome variable aggregated over a state-year and mandate is an indicator variable
that equals one if a state has mandated physician/prescriber enrollment or query and equals zero if
a state does not have mandated physician/prescriber enrollment or query. The variable
healthagencies will also be coded similarly as healthagencies will equal 0 and consumer-facing
agencies will equal zero. Two different outcomes (yst) will be tested: age-adjusted opioid overdose
death rates and opioid prescription rates. Each regression will contain fixed effects for states (δs)
and years (δt) to account for any differences between states and years, respectively. In addition,
standard errors will be clustered at the state-level (εst).
Second, the effect of each specific agency on PDMP effectiveness will be tested by
determine the differences in the same two dependent variables opioid prescription rate and opioid
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overdose deaths. Six different operating agencies will be tested: state Pharmacy Boards, state
Department of Health, Law Enforcement, Professional Licensing Agency, Substance Abuse
Agency, and Consumer Protection Agency. I hypothesize that agencies targeted with managing
consumer behavior such as Law Enforcement and Consumer Protection Agencies will result in a
more effective PDMP with lower opioid overdose rates and opioid prescription rates. The second
regression model will be:
yst = δs + δt + β2(mandate) + mandate*(deptofhealth) + mandate*(consumerprotection) +
mandate*(professionallicensing) + mandate*(lawenforcement) + mandate*(substanceabuse) +
εst
where similarly, y is an outcome variable aggregated over a state-year and mandate is an indicator
variable that equals one if a state has mandated physician/prescriber enrollment or query and equals
zero if a state does not have mandated physician/prescriber enrollment or query. Likewise, the
variable healthagencies will equal one and consumer-facing agencies will equal zero. Two
different outcomes (yst) will be tested: age-adjusted opioid overdose death rates and opioid
prescription rates in each of the six operating agency types. This regression will also contain fixed
effects for states (δs) and years (δt) with standard errors clustered at the state-level (εst).
In both empirical analyses, only states with mandated PDMPs will be used in this study.
Many research papers have proved that the statutory mandates that require prescribers to register
with their respective state’s PDMP and use it are significantly more effective in opioid
prescriptions and opioid-related deaths (Suffoletto et al. 2018; Buchmueller and Carey 2018; Wen,
Schackman, Aden, and Bao 2017). Because this metric is fairly common one where over half of
states have instituted this policy, analysis for this paper will look at the effect of operating agency
in states with mandated PDMP programs.
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Qualitative Analysis: General Perception of PDMPs
A second part of the analysis will contain a qualitative portion that determines the general
sentiment and behavior associated with Pennsylvania’s PDMP. More specifically, this section will
aim to address how Pennsylvania’s PDMP, which is by the PA Department of Health, impacts
effectiveness in lowering opioid prescription rates and opioid overdose rates by concentrating on
physician and prescriber behavior patterns and overall usage. Perceptions of a PDMP could
affected by how intensely and carefully users view and utilize information provided by PDMPs.
These insights can be analyzed through a structured survey of physicians that contain qualitative
data that question about the usage of PDMPs, such as how often physicians check PDMPs before
prescribing, and if physicians ever change prescription schedules due to uncovered PDMP data
(Hildebran et al. 2014; Leichtling et al. 2016). Physicians who have shown to find PDMP
utilization the most valuable, including emergency medicine physicians, pain management, and
primary care physicians, will be the participants in this survey (Irvine et al. 2014). The goals of
this analysis aim to determine how the presence of PDMP operated by a certain agency
qualitatively impact clinical use and analyze potential patterns of PDMP use by physicians.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Effect of Operating Agency on Opioid Prescription Rates
Operating agency type for each state can be found on Table 1 in addition to information
regarding the presence of a mandate. Having a mandate is defined as a PDMP mandating
physician/prescriber enrollment or query, information provided by the Prescription Drug
Monitoring Program Training and Technical Assistance Center. Table 2 and Table 3 report the
results of the time series regression analysis using retail opioid prescription rates dispensed per
100 individuals as the dependent variable. Years 2006 to 2016 for all 49 states including
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Washington D.C. are included in the time series, which were provided in the CDC data set.
Missouri is eliminated as it is the only state that has not implemented a PDMP at the time of study.
The effect of the mandate was accounted for as an indicator variable as shown in both Tables 2
and 3.
Table 2 looks at the significance of and compares retail opioid prescription rates healthfacing agencies against consumer-facing agencies. All of the point estimates, including the year
measurements, presence of a health-facing agency, and presence of a health-facing agency
combined with a mandate, show statistical significance. The presence of a mandate, which has
been previously identified as an importance factor in PDMP effectiveness, is statistically
significant in this analysis as well and corroborates similar studies on mandates. The presence of
just a health agency alone reduces opioid prescription rates by approximately 15 prescriptions per
100 individuals, resulting in a statistically significant at the 5% level. Examining the combined
impact of a mandate with a PDMP that is implemented and operated by a health-facing agency
further reduces the rate of opioid prescriptions by almost 26 prescriptions per 100 individuals
compared with consumer-facing operating agencies. The presence of a health-facing agency such
as the Department of Health, State Pharmacy Board, and Substance Abuse Agency, operating the
PDMP displays statistical significance at the 1% level, showing statistically significant to a high
degree. Hence, this data reflects the overall benefit of having a health-facing agency operate and
implement a PDMP compared to a consumer-facing agency.
A second analysis using opioid prescription rates was conducted on the individual impact
of the four most common operating agencies, Department of Health, Pharmacy Boards, Law
Enforcement, Professional Licensing. The results are reported in Table 3. Similar to the previous
analysis, 49 states and Washington D.C. were included for years 2006 to 2016. Given there were
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only three states—Maine, Maryland, and North Carolina—with a PDMP run by a Substance Abuse
Agency, and only one state—Connecticut—with a PDMP operated by a Consumer Protection
Agency, both Substance Abuse Agency and Consumer Protection Agency coefficients should be
interpreted with caution. Due to collinearity, the interaction between mandate and Consumer
Protection Agency and mandate Substance Abuse Agency were not available. Compared to a state
Pharmacy Board, the presence of the Department of Health and Professional Licensing Agency
alone, respectively, both show a decrease in retail opioid prescription rates. However, both these
points estimates are not statistically significant at the 5% level. The individual impact of a Law
Enforcement department operating and implementing a PDMP resulted in an opposite intended
effect, in which opioid prescription rates increased by 26 prescriptions per 100 individuals,
reaching statistically significance at the 1% level. This outcome may be affected by a relatively
smaller sample of four states with Law Enforcement, which may create limitations in identifying
the actual impact. Once combined with the effects of a mandate present in the PDMP, both
Department of Health and Professional Licensing experienced decreased retail prescribing rates
by one and 16 prescriptions per 100 individuals, respectively, although both did not reach
statistically significance. The only operating agency, when combined with a mandate, that shows
significance is Law Enforcement, likely for similar reasons as stated previously. The data shows
that once effectiveness of PDMPs are broken down into each specific operating agency type,
operating agency type likely does not matter given only one operating agency reached statistical
significance.
Effect of Operating Agency on Opioid Overdose Death Rates
In addition to analyzing the effects on opioid prescription rates, another consideration is
the impact of operating agency type on opioid overdose death rates per 100,000 population, as
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provided by the Kaiser Family Foundation. The presence of a DPMP program not only encourages
prescribers to be more aware of the frequency and dosage of opioid medications, but also further
impacts usage and drives down adverse death rates from opioid overdose. Years 1999 to 2017 for
49 states, excluding Missouri, and Washington D.C. are included in this model.
Table 4 looks at the significance of and compares opioid overdose death rates for healthfacing agencies against consumer-facing agencies. The first analysis from Table 4 examines the
impact of a state health-facing agency implementing and operating the PDMP. Both the presence
of a mandate and the presence of a health-facing agency running and operating the PDMP lead to
decreases in opioid overdose death rates of two deaths and four deaths per 100,000 population,
respectively. The health-facing agency impact also show statistical significance, with a reaching
statistically significance at 1%. After accounting for the effects of the mandate, the combined
impact of the mandate in addition to the presence of a health-facing agency shows an even larger
drop of six deaths per 100,000 population in opioid overdose death rates. With statistical
significance of 5%, such results show very high statistical significance for the effectiveness of
PDMPs implemented and operated by health-facing agencies.
The second analysis that utilized opioid overdose death rates looked at the individual
impact of the four most common operating agencies, Department of Health, Pharmacy Boards,
Law Enforcement, and Professional Licensing. Substance Abuse Agency and Consumer
Protection Agency are again excluded due to the low number of states. Results are shown in Table
5, and again, 49 states excluding Missouri, and Washington D.C. are included in this analysis.
Similar to the previous regression, the interaction between mandate and Consumer Protection
Agency and mandate Substance Abuse Agency were not available due to collinearity reasons.
Excluding the impact of the mandate and examining the isolated impact of each operating agency

18

types reflect findings opposite of previous models. This set of outcomes reflects a shift in overall
PDMP effectiveness as opioid overdose death rates increase for PDMPs run by the Department of
Health, Law Enforcement, and Professional Licensing agencies by five deaths, six deaths, and 4
deaths, respectively, when compared to Pharmacy Boards. In addition, both Department of Health
and Law Enforcement reaches statistically significance of 1%. However, due to the small number
of states with Law Enforcement as their operating agency, this data may reveal a trend over a
correlation. When the impact of the mandate is considered in this analysis, the model shows
decreases in opioid overdose death rates for Department of Health, Law Enforcement, and
Professional Licensing Agency of eight, 12, and seven deaths per 100,000 individuals when
compared to Pharmacy Boards. In addition, all three operating agencies, when combined with the
effect of the mandate, display statistical significance of 5%. Such results may signal that it may
not be the operating agency responsible for the decreases in opioid overdose death rate, but the
overall presence of a mandate.
Regression Analysis: Model Assumptions and Limitations
This analysis rests upon a variety of assumptions made in the model. While year fixed
effects are included in the regression, state fixed effects could not be included due to effects of
collinearity as operating agency type does not vary within a state. Therefore, the exact degree of
coefficients calculated in opioid prescription rates and opioid overdose death rates does not
account for state by state variations, which is a limitation in robustness of this analysis. However,
data does seemingly argue that the presence of health-facing agency effectively reduces opioid
prescription rates by 25.9 prescriptions per 100 prescriptions and opioid overdose death rates by
six deaths per 100,000 individuals, both coefficients of which are statistically significant at the 1%
level.
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A second important assumption that rests on the interpretation of these results is the limited
impact of other opioid-related policies that may have biased the effectiveness of a specific
operating agency type. While the presence of the mandate has been repeatedly shown as a key
characteristic in measuring effectiveness of a PDMP due to numerous studies stating its efficacy,
other potentially influential characteristics were not included. Most of these characteristics were
eliminated from the model due to high degrees of similarity across states; for example, 40 out of
49 states plus Washington D.C. had PDMPs that covered drugs in Schedules II through IV while
nine out of 49 states had PDMPs that covered drugs in Schedules II through V. Schedule V drugs
are generally used for antidiarrheal, antitussive, and analgesic purposes and do not include opioid
medications such as hydrocodone and acetaminophen, which fall in Schedule II. As all states
included Schedule II drugs, the class in which opioid medications fall, the impact of drug schedules
was excluded from the regression model. In addition, another key assumption that was omitted
due to the high degrees of similarity across all states is the impact of data collection frequency. All
states except four states—California, Hawaii, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania—collect updated data
for the PDMP daily or during the next business day. California and Hawaii both collect data every
seven day, Oklahoma collects data at point of sale, and Pennsylvania collects data every two to
three business days. EHR integration and interstate data sharing were two other variables ignored
as the majority of states had not completed EHR integration or interstate data sharing.
Physician Perception of PA’s PDMP and Usage Patterns
A second part of this study looks at the how the implementation and operation of
Pennsylvania’s PDMP, which is run by the Pennsylvania Department of Health, affected
physicians’ prescribing behavior. Emergency medicine, pain management, and primary care
physicians at the University of Pennsylvania Health System are targeted given the frequency
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PDMP usage. The participants are asked if they are aware of the operating agency that runs PA’s
PDMP, how often they refer and check the PDMP before prescribing any controlled medications,
if they have ever changed a patient’s prescription plan after viewing the PDMP, and how
knowledgeable they perceive they are about the functionalities of the PDMP. The survey questions
were developed by the author and were run online via Qualtrics survey form. Table 6 details the
questions asked in the survey. After reaching out to 256 physicians via email messaging, 94
physicians responded to the survey.
Survey responses are reported in Table 7, which breaks down the responses to each
question and answer choice. In the survey of 94 participants, 100% of physician participants knew
what a PDMP was, and 46 (48.9%) physicians stated that they knew the operating agency that
operates PA’s PDMP, which was the Department of Health. Among the 46 physicians who first
stated they knew the operating agency, 89.13% correctly selected the Department of Health.
Among the 48 physicians who initially did not know what the operating agency was, a large
majority, 72.92%, guessed and selected the correct agency type out of a multiple-choice question
that provided the following six options: Department of Health, Pharmacy Board, Substance Abuse
Agency, Law Enforcement, Professional Licensing Agency, and Consumer Protection Agency.
Those who did not select the correct agency type most commonly guessed Substance Abuse
Agency, Pharmacy Board, and Professional Licensing Agency. A graphic of such results is
depicted in Figure 3.
The survey also aimed to uncover physician prescribing patterns given their knowledge
about PA’s PDMP, which is shown in Table 8. 62 or 65.96% of the physician respondents stated
they “always” check the PDMP prior to prescribing any controlled medications including opioids
medications, while another 22 physicians or 23.40% only check the PDMP “most of the time”.
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Figure 4 details this breakdown. Of all the participants, 71 physicians or 75.53%, have adjusted a
patient’s prescription plan or have made a mental health/substance abuse referral due to data
provided in a PDMP. Lastly, on a sliding scale with 1 being not knowledgeable at all and 10 being
very knowledge, the 14 physicians rated themselves a 10 of their knowledge of the functionalities
of the PDMP. The lowest score was a 2, and the average score of 8.085. Overall, the majority of
physician participants of the survey effectively utilize the PDMP’s functionalities in considering
an opioid medication prescription plan.
Survey Limitations
Analysis from the survey data rests upon a number of key limitations. Due to the impacts
of COVID-19, in-depth personal interviews could not be conducted so surveys were substituted
instead. Survey response rate was therefore suboptimal, given the lower than expected response
rate of 36.7%. Surveys were sent out to all physicians listed on the University of Pennsylvania
Health System’s emergency medicine, pain management, and primary care team via email. While
participation was encouraged, many physicians may have been surrounded with other urgent
matters. Low response rates from physicians introduces potential bias as those responders may
have systematically different characteristics from non-responding physicians. Moreover, this
survey specifically targets University of Pennsylvania Health System physicians, which may
provide another layer of bias given the University of Pennsylvania has spent much effort training
their faculty on PDMP usage. As so, this data may not be generalizable to physicians in other
hospital systems or states. Lastly, social desirability could provide biased results although all
survey respondents remained anonymous and all answers remained confidential.
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS
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Several key conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, the results from the quantitative
portion of the study suggest that in general, health-facing operating agencies seem to perform more
effectively than consumer-facing agencies. Combined with the presence of a mandate, the effect
of a health-facing agency was even more amplified. This holds true for both opioid prescribing
rates, which are directly affected by PDMP usage, and opioid overdose death rates, which are
connected by the decrease in accessibility of opioids available for medical use; both of which
showed highly statistically significant effects. Decreasing the dosages of opioid prescriptions or
adjusting prescription frequency contributes to a reduced likelihood of opioid addiction, which is
highly correlated with length of use and prescription dosage levels. To best understand and limit
the repercussions related to opioid additions, health-facing operating agencies such as a state’s
Department of Health or Pharmacy Board may in fact have the most applicable knowledge to
create policies and programs to help control opioid dispensing. These operating agencies likely are
already very familiar with prescribing patterns and physician behavior, especially compared with
consumer-facing operating agencies which may not have such necessary insight. Consumer-facing
agencies, which include Law Enforcement or Professional Licensing mainly function and manage
activities outside of the scope of medical prescription activity and opioid use, and therefore these
agencies are likely less successful with creating an effective PDMP targeted at changing physician
prescribing behavior.
Although these results indicate that effectiveness of a PMDP can be affected by the
presence of a health-facing operating agency, this study shows that there is limited impact when
considering the effect of each individual operating agency type. Combined with the presence of a
mandate, each operating agency type decreased the opioid prescription rate, although most of the
coefficients were not statistically significant. Combined with the presence of a mandate, each
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operating agency type also lead to reductions in opioid overdose death rates, with most coefficients
showing statistical significance in this case. A possible explanation could be the state effects that
were left out due to collinearity concerns. Another consideration could be the effect of a relatively
smaller sample size when considering the impact of each individual operating agency compared
to the combined impact of all health-facing and consumer-facing operating agency type. While a
significant portion of states had PDMPs run by the Department of Health or Pharmacy Board,
fewer states had PDMPs run by the Professional Licensing Agency or Law Enforcement, and such
smaller data samples likely impacted statistical significance of the results.
The results from the qualitative survey portion of the study suggest that a portion of
emergency medicine, pain management, and primary care physicians are not only aware of the
functionalities of a PDMP, but also have general knowledge about the operational factors as well.
Almost half of the physicians knew that Pennsylvania’s PDMP was operated and implemented by
the PA Department of Health, and out of those who did not initially know, a majority correctly
guessed the right operating agency. Hence, such results portray the overall knowledge and
familiarity that physicians may have, especially among the three physician specialty types that
most commonly utilize PDMPs. From the survey responses, the majority of physicians have
actively changed a patient’s prescription plan after referring to patient data from the PDMP,
indicating the effectiveness of Pennsylvania’s PDMP, operated by the PA Department of Health,
in limiting medical opioid accessibility. By reducing medical opioid prescriptions or encouraging
patients to seek mental health or substance abuse treatment, opioid overdose death rates are likely
negatively affected as well. As the Department of Health falls into the facing-agency operating
agency category, these results align with the previous quantitative finding that health-facing
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agencies show greater effectiveness in reducing opioid prescription rates and decreasing opioid
overdose death rates than consumer-facing facing agencies.
Health-facing agencies, which contribute to more effective control of medically dispensed
opioid use, are likely to have greater impact due to analogous knowledge of physicians prescribing
patterns. Being able to identify processes, such as mandates, that persuade physicians to more
proactively consider an opioid prescription plan is critical in controlling the opioid epidemic. Most
of states’ Department of Health or Pharmacy Board is headed by directors with medical degrees
and practicing experience, which often offer first-hand knowledge of physician behavior.
Pennsylvania’s Department of Health is run by Dr. Rachel Levine, a Fellow of the Society of
Adolescent Health and Medicine and accomplished author on the opioid crisis, medical marijuana,
and adolescent medicine (Department of Health Executive Leadership 2020). As so, a
recommendation to further increase effectiveness of PDMP would be for states should consider
allowing a health-facing agency to partner in operating and implementing a PDMP. Consumerfacing agencies such as Law Enforcement or Professional Licensing Agencies likely lack the
medical knowledge and general expertise necessary to design procedures and policies that target
specific physician prescribing behavior. As a result, these states hence experience an overall less
effective PDMP. Missouri, the singular state that has not yet passed legislation to institute a PDMP,
would likely benefit most from the MO Department of Health or MO Pharmacy Board
implementing and operating its PDMP.
FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
Future research should focus on further building upon understanding the impact of
operational characteristics, which has not yet been studied. Some operational characteristics that
differ across states’ PDMPs include sources of funding, which vary from state funds, federal
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grants, and local funds. Employee headcount is another factor that differs across different PDMPs,
including the number of operational employees, technical workers, and epidemiological analysts.
Lastly, given the connection between containing illegal opioids and Law Enforcement, another
operational characteristic should consider the various requirements of Law Enforcement to view
and access PDMP data in curbing physician over-prescribing. Law Enforcement in different
PDMPs may need a subpoena, court order, probable cause, search warrant, proper need, or other
requirements to access a PDMP, all with varying degrees of accessibility which may impact
physician prescribing behaviors.
Given the benefits of PDMPs, which include reduced opioid access through limiting
prescription and decreased opioid overdose rates, more attention is needed to maximize their
clinical utility to reach their full potential. Because PDMPs are state-run programs, it is essential
to determine and understand the impacts of both operational and functional characteristics to best
reduce opioid usage and increase patient safety.
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Figure 1: Opioid overdose death rates among all ages from years 1999 to 2017. (CDC Wonder
2017).
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Figure 2: Graphic of PDMP structure and different parties involved. Healthcare providers and
prescribers/pharmacies can both input patient information into the PDMP and view patient
prescribing history. Such information is commonly shared with state insurance programs,
healthcare licensure boards, state and federal health departments, and law enforcement.

33

Figure 3: Graphic of the operating agency that runs the PDMP in each state and D.C.
Note: Missouri does not have PDMP and therefore is not shaded in the map.
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Table 1: State Prescription Drug Monitoring Program and correlated operating agency type.
State Name
Abbreviation Operating Agency
Mandate
Alabama
AL
Department of Health
Mandate
Alaska
AK
Pharmacy Boards
Mandate
Arizona
AZ
Pharmacy Boards
Mandate
Arkansas
AR
Department of Health
Mandate
California
CA
Law Enforcement
Mandate
Colorado
CO
Pharmacy Boards
Mandate
Connecticut
CT
Consumer Protection Agency
Mandate
Delaware
DW
Professional Licensing Agency
Mandate
District of Columbia
DC
Department of Health
No mandate
Florida
FL
Department of Health
Mandate
Georgia
GA
Department of Health
Mandate
Hawaii
HI
Law Enforcement
Mandate
Idaho
ID
Pharmacy Boards
No mandate
Illinois
IL
Department of Health
Mandate
Indiana
IN
Professional Licensing Agency
Mandate
Iowa
IA
Pharmacy Boards
Mandate
Kansas
KS
Pharmacy Boards
No mandate
Kentucky
KY
Department of Health
Mandate
Louisiana
LA
Pharmacy Boards
Mandate
Maine
ME
Substance Abuse Agency
Mandate
Maryland
MD
Substance Abuse Agency
Mandate
Massachusetts
MA
Department of Health
Mandate
Michigan
MI
Professional Licensing Agency
Mandate
Minnesota
MN
Pharmacy Boards
Mandate
Mississippi
MS
Pharmacy Boards
Mandate
Missouri
MO
Montana
MT
Pharmacy Boards
No mandate
Nebraska
NE
Department of Health
No mandate
Nevada
NV
Pharmacy Boards
Mandate
New Hampshire
NH
Pharmacy Boards
Mandate
New Jersey
NJ
Law Enforcement
Mandate
New Mexico
NM
Pharmacy Boards
Mandate
New York
NY
Department of Health
Mandate
North Carolina
NC
Substance Abuse Agency
Mandate
North Dakota
ND
Pharmacy Boards
Mandate
Ohio
OH
Pharmacy Boards
Mandate
Oklahoma
OK
Law Enforcement
No mandate
Oregon
OR
Department of Health
Mandate
Pennsylvania
PA
Department of Health
Mandate
Rhode Island
RI
Department of Health
Mandate
South Carolina
SC
Department of Health
No mandate
South Dakota
SD
Pharmacy Boards
Mandate
Tennessee
TN
Pharmacy Boards
Mandate
Texas
TX
Pharmacy Boards
Mandate
Utah
UT
Professional Licensing Agency
Mandate
Vermont
VT
Department of Health
Mandate
Virginia
VA
Professional Licensing Agency
Mandate
Washington
WA
Department of Health
Mandate
West Virginia
WV
Pharmacy Boards
Mandate
Wisconsin
WI
Professional Licensing Agency
No mandate
Wyoming
WY
Pharmacy Boards
No mandate
Note: Data was sourced from Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Training and Technical Assistance Center
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Table 2: Regression output for impact of health-facing agency vs. consumer-facing agency for
opioid prescription rates.

Coefficients
(Intercept)
year2016
year2015
year2014
year2013
year2012
year2011
year2010
year2009
year2008
year2007
year2006
mandate
health agency
mandate*health agency

Estimated
Std.
78.521
9.384
14.167
19.208
21.706
25.116
24.097
26.434
25.534
26.437
23.274
21.225
-25.721
-15.229
-25.902

Error
6.256
4.530
4.554
4.554
4.577
4.683
4.742
5.038
5.083
5.181
5.414
5.630
5.970
6.278
6.815

t-value
12.551
2.071
3.111
4.218
4.742
5.363
5.081
5.246
5.023
5.103
4.299
3.770
-4.308
-2.426
-3.801

Pr(>|t|)
< 2e-16
0.038867
0.001978
2.96E-05
2.82E-06
1.29E-07
5.44E-07
2.36E-07
7.26E-07
4.88E-07
2.09E-05
0.000184
2.01E-05
0.015647
0.000163

***
*
**
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
*
***

Note: This table reports results using the regression equation found on page 13 using opioid prescription rates
reported by the CDC as the variable of measurement. Fixed effects for years are always included. Robust p-values
are as follows: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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Table 3: Regression output for impact each operating agency type for opioid prescription rates.

Coefficients
(Intercept)
year2016
year2015
year2014
year2013
year2012
year2011
year2010
year2009
year2008
year2007
year2006
mandate
consumerprotection
deptofhealth
lawenforcement
professionallicensing
substanceabuse
mandate*consumerprotection
mandate*deptofhealth
mandate*lawenforcement
mandate*professionallicensing
mandate*substanceabuse

Estimated
Std.
64.840
9.384
14.130
19.171
21.720
24.384
23.709
25.299
24.440
25.290
21.807
19.783
1.138
-20.391
-3.372
26.334
-15.181
-2.537
--1.234
-40.592
-15.341
--

Error
4.485
4.236
4.258
4.258
4.281
4.383
4.438
4.717
4.758
4.850
5.076
5.280
3.865
6.911
5.990
7.043
10.131
4.339
-6.505
4.597
10.671
--

t-value
14.456
2.215
3.318
4.502
5.074
5.563
5.342
5.363
5.136
5.214
4.297
3.747
0.294
-2.951
-0.563
3.739
-1.498
-0.585
--0.174
-3.500
-1.531
--

Pr(>|t|)
< 2e-16
0.027216
0.000978
8.54E-06
5.66E-07
4.52E-08
1.45E-07
1.30E-07
4.15E-07
2.80E-07
2.12E-05
0.000202
0.768560
0.003333
0.573774
0.000208
0.134696
0.559007
-0.861716
0.024714
0.126366
--

***
*
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

**
***

*

Note: This table reports results using the regression equation found on page 13 using opioid prescription rates
reported by the CDC as the variable of measurement. Fixed effects for years are always included. Robust p-values
are as follows: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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Table 4: Regression output for impact of health-facing agency vs. consumer-facing agency for
opioid overdose deaths.

Coefficients
(Intercept)
year2017
year2016
year2015
year2014
year2013
year2012
year2011
year2010
year2009
year2008
year2007
year2006
year2005
year2004
year2003
year2002
year2001
year2000
mandate
health agency
mandate*health agency

Estimated
Std.
4.545
14.779
12.942
9.599
7.954
6.279
5.754
5.549
4.857
4.485
4.725
4.498
4.232
3.599
2.900
2.719
1.813
1.181
0.306
-2.464
-4.413
-6.456

Error
1.827
1.696
1.696
1.701
1.701
1.707
1.736
1.744
1.791
1.802
1.802
1.856
1.8891
1.9505
1.9751
2.0023
2.0323
2.0323
2.032
1.276
1.501
1.613

t-value
2.488
8.716
7.633
5.642
4.675
3.678
3.315
3.182
2.712
2.489
2.622
2.423
2.24
1.845
1.468
1.358
0.892
0.581
0.151
-1.931
-2.939
-4.003

Pr(>|t|)
0.013187
< 2e-16
1.18E-13
2.82E-08
3.79E-06
0.000261
0.000982
0.001553
0.006918
0.013143
0.009021
0.015733
0.025525
0.065647
0.142699
0.175143
0.372905
0.561342
0.880280
0.054046
0.003446
7.21E-05

*
***
***
***
***
***
***
**
**
*
**
*
*

**
***

Note: This table reports results using the regression equation found on page 14 using opioid overdose deaths
reported by the Kaiser Family Foundation as the variable of measurement. Fixed effects for years are always
included. Robust p-values are as follows: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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Table 5: Regression output for impact each operating agency type for opioid overdose deaths.

Coefficients
(Intercept)
year2017
year2016
year2015
year2014
year2013
year2012
year2011
year2010
year2009
year2008
year2007
year2006
year2005
year2004
year2003
year2002
year2001
year2000
mandate
consumerprotection
deptofhealth
lawenforcement
professionallicensing
substanceabuse
mandate*consumerprotection
mandate*deptofhealth
mandate*lawenforcement
mandate*professionallicensing
mandate*substanceabuse

Estimated
Std.
-0.977
14.150
12.314
9.056
7.411
5.769
5.159
4.982
3.985
3.646
3.885
3.999
3.863
3.314
2.700
2.629
1.813
1.181
0.306
6.909
-0.008
5.167
6.400
4.357
0.261
--7.897
-12.380
-6.676
--

Error
1.740
1.642
1.642
1.647
1.647
1.653
1.678
1.686
1.734
1.745
1.745
1.793
1.823
1.882
1.906
1.931
1.960
1.960
1.960
1.189
1.821
1.946
1.675
2.725
1.121
-2.058
1.927
2.843
--

t-value
-0.562
8.615
7.497
5.499
4.501
3.491
3.075
2.955
2.298
2.090
2.227
2.230
2.119
1.761
1.416
1.361
0.925
0.603
0.156
5.813
-0.004
2.655
3.820
1.599
0.233
--3.837
-6.424
-2.348
--

Pr(>|t|)
0.574664
< 2e-16
3.07E-13
6.14E-08
8.47E-06
0.000525
0.002223
0.003278
0.022000
0.037142
0.026397
0.026192
0.034581
0.078927
0.157264
0.174083
0.355534
0.546985
0.875895
1.11E-08
0.996517
0.008183
0.000150
0.110537
0.815628
-0.000141
3.14E-10
0.019256
--

Note: This table reports results using the regression equation found on page 14 using opioid overdose deaths
reported by the Kaiser Family Foundation as the variable of measurement. Fixed effects for years are always
included. Robust p-values are as follows: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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***
***
***
***
***
**
**
*
*
*
*
*

***
**
***

***
***
*

Table 6: Questions included in the survey sent to emergency medicine, pain management, and
primary care physicians.
Survey Questions
Q1. Do you know what the Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP) is?
Select:
Yes
No
Q2. Do you know the operating agency responsible for managing and implementing Pennsylvania's
PDMP?
Select:
Yes
No
Q3. [IF SELECTED "YES" TO Q2"] Please select the operating agency responsible for managing and
implementing Pennsylvania's PDMP.
Select:
PA Department of Health
PA Pharmacy Board
PA Substance Abuse Agency
PA Law Enforcement
PA Consumer Protection Agency
PA Professional Licensing Agency
Q4. [IF SELECTED "NO" TO Q2"] If you were to guess the operating agency responsible for
managing and implementing Pennsylvania's PDMP, which of the following would you pick?
Select:
PA Department of Health
PA Pharmacy Board
PA Substance Abuse Agency
PA Law Enforcement
PA Consumer Protection Agency
PA Professional Licensing Agency
Q5. How often do you check and refer to PDMP data before prescribing controlled medications for
patients (such as opioids or benzodiazepines)?
Select:
Always
Most of the time
About half the time
Sometimes
Never
Q6. Have you ever made any mental health or substance abuse referrals, or discharged a patient from
a prescription after viewing the PDMP?
Select:
Yes
No
Q7. How familiar do you perceive you are in understanding the functionalities of the PDMP? (1 being
NOT familiar, 10 being VERY familiar).
Slide option:
1 to 10
Note: This survey was sent out to participants via Qualtrics survey.
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Table 7: Survey responses for question one through four regarding general PDMP knowledge
and operating agency knowledge.
General PDMP Knowledge
Q1. Do you know what the
Prescription Drug Monitoring
Program (PDMP) is?

Answer Choices
Yes

No

94 (100%)

0 (0%)

Yes

No

46 (48.9%)

48 (51.1%)

Department
of Health

Pharmacy
Board

Substance
Abuse
Agency

Law
Enforcement

Consumer
Protection
Agency

Professional
Licensing
Agency

41(89.13%)

2 (4.35%)

0 (0%)

2 (4.35%)

1 (2.17%)

0 (0%)

35 (72.92%

2 (4.17%)

7 (14.58%)

1 (2.08%)

1 (2.08%)

2 (4.17%)

Operating Agency Knowledge

Q2. Do you know the operating
agency responsible for managing
and implementing Pennsylvania's
PDMP?

Q3. [IF SELECTED "YES" TO
Q2"] Please select the operating
agency responsible for managing
and implementing Pennsylvania's
PDMP.

Q4. [IF SELECTED "NO" TO
Q2"] If you were to guess the
operating agency responsible for
managing and implementing
Pennsylvania's PDMP, which of
the following would you pick?
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Table 8: Survey responses for question five through six regarding physicians’ PDMP
prescription and usage patterns.
PDMP Prescription Patterns

Q5. How often do you check and
refer to PDMP data before
prescribing controlled
medications for patients (such as
opioids or benzodiazepines)?

Q6. Have you ever made any
mental health or substance abuse
referrals, or discharged a patient
from a prescription after viewing
the PDMP?

Answer Choices
Always

Most of the
time

About half
the time

Sometimes

Never

62 (65.96%)

22 (23.40%)

3 (3.19%)

6 (6.38%)

1 (1.06%)

Yes

No

71 (75.53%)

23 (24.47%)

Sliding Scale from 1 to 10
Q7. How familiar do you
perceive you are in understanding
the functionalities of the PDMP?
(1 being NOT familiar, 10 being
VERY familiar).

average: 8.085
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Answers to Q3 of
respondents who
selected “Yes” to Q2
(knowledge of PDMP
operating agency)

Answers to Q4 of
respondents who
selected “No” to Q2
(knowledge of PDMP
operating agency)
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PA Law Enforcement
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PA Consumer Protection Agency

PA Substance Abuse Agency
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Figure 3: Comparison of response answers to Q3 (answered by respondents who stated they are
aware of PA’s PDMP operating agency in Q2) and Q4 (answered by respondents who stated they
are unaware of PA’s PDMP operating agency in Q2).
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Figure 4: Breakdown of Q5 responses that indicate how often participants check and refer to the
PDMP data before prescribing controlled medications.
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